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logically be the preferable forum, as state judges are presumably more
thoroughly versed in the intricacies of state law."04
The advisability of a literal reading of Kenrose seems questionable.
Certainly, little exception can be taken to a finding by the Fourth Circuit
that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a particular case would exceed
the limits of trial court discretion. In so far as the opinion is grounded
upon the inadequacy of the trial court's jurisdictional power, however, the
basis of the decision is less than clear. If the decision rests solely upon a
finding that the dismissal of the third-party complaint reduced Kilodyne
to the position of a mere co-defendant, then a ruling based upon the rule
of Strawbridge v. Curtiss may be justified. Such is not the case where this
decision is based upon the question of whether federal ancillary jurisdic-
tion extends, as a matter of principle, to plaintiffs' claims against third-
party defendants. The constitutional power analysis of Gibbs as applied
in Revere casts a long shadow which seems to reach the heart of the
Fourth Circuit's rationale. It would appear that this question has not yet
been answered clearly and convincingly by the Fourth Circuit. Conse-
quently, it is conceivable that, upon a fact situation calling more clearly
for a comprehensive federal adjudication and presenting only the question
of extending ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiff's claim against a third-
party defendant, the imprecise mandate of Kenrose might not be found
to control.
ARTHUR PENNINGTON BOLTON III
ADOPTIVE ADMISSIONS IN CUSTODY AND THE
CONSTITUTION
In order for a statement by an accused in custody' to be admissible
in court, the statement must have been preceded by a warning to the
suspect of his right to remain silent. 2 However, the police agent is not
" WRIGHT § 23, at 75.
'For discussion of the term "custody," see text accompanying notes 41-48 infra.
21n Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court specified procedural
safeguards required to secure the fifth amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination:
[The accused] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
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required to warn the person accused that his silence may be used against
him.3 Thus, the adoptive admissions rule of evidence, which creates an
inference of acquiescence in a personally inculpatory statement from a
failure to deny that statement, 4 sanctions possible punishment for reliance
upon a constitutional right. This result appears to violate the defendant's
fifth amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination and his
fourteenth amendment right of due process of law. For this reason, the
courts have restricted application of this rule of evidence.5 The recent
31d. The quoted language of note 2 supra is all the warning required to be given a
suspect before questioning.
'This rule is predicated upon the "natural" reaction of a person to deny an untrue
inculpatory statement about him made in his presence and hearing. IV J. WIGMOkE, Evi-
DENCE, § 1071 (Chadbourne rev. 1972) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE, § 270 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. See, e.g., Sparf v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). Accord, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 507(b) (1942); RULES
OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, effective July 1, 1973,
adopted by the Supreme Court, 93 S. Ct.-(1972) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL RULES].
Rule 801 reads in pertinent part:
(d) . . . A statement is not hearsay if . . . (2) The statement is
offered against a party and is . . . (B) a statement of which he has mani-




(B) Under established principles an admission may be made by adopting
or acquiescing in the statement of another.. . . Adoption or acquiescence
may be manifested in any appropriate manner. When silence is relied
upon, the theory is that the person would, under the circumstances, protest
the statement made in his presence, if untrue. The decision in each case
calls for an evaluation in terms of probable human behavior. In civil cases,
the results have generally been satisfactory. In criminal cases, however,
troublesome questions have been raised by decisions holding that failure
to deny is an admission: the inference is a fairly weak one, to begin with;
silence may be motivated by advice of counsel or realization that "any-
thing you say may be used against you"; unusual opportunity is afforded
to manufacture evidence; and encroachment upon the privilege against
self-incrimination seems inescapably to be involved. However, recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court relating to custodial interrogation and the
right to counsel appear to resolve these difficulties. Hence the rule con-
tains no special provisions concerning failure to deny in criminal cases.
5E.g., Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956); United States v.
McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 261-62 (6th Cir. 1967). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 467 (1966).
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case of Miller v. Cox' illustrates the problems inherent in the employment
of adoptive admissions in criminal cases.
Miller v. Cox
Howard Miller and Lavone Robbs were apprehended as suspects in
a gas station robbery and abduction of the attendant which occurred in
Richmond, Virginia. The police took the suspects to the police station
and placed them in a room with Grover Robbs, Lavone's brother, also a
suspect in the robbery and abduction. The police read them an enumera-
tion of their constitutional rights pursuant to the requirements in
Miranda v. Arizona.7 A police detective then drew Grover Robbs aside;
in the presence and hearing of Miller and Lavone Robbs, Grover admit-
ted that the three had executed the robbery and abduction. Neither Miller
nor Lavone Robbs made any response at that time, but they had pre-
viously denied participation in the crime and were subsequently to repeat
this denial.
A judge sitting without a jury tried the three suspects. The gas station
attendant who had been abducted identified all three co-defendants, not-
ing his opportunity to observe them during the abduction. Although
Grover Robbs did not testify, both his confession and Miller's silence in
response thereto were admitted as evidence bearing on the latter's guilt.
All three were convicted of armed robbery, abduction, and unauthorized
used of an automobile. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia af-
firmed this conviction.' Having exhausted his state remedies,' Miller ap-
plied for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).'
The petition was dismissed by the district court;" Miller appealed this
dismissal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the dis-
trict court's decision.
In his appeal to the circuit court, Miller raised four claims for relief,
two of which pertained to the use of the adoptive admission. One of
8457 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 433 (1972).
7384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'457 F.2d at 701. The denial of the writ by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,
rendered December 6, 1968, is unreported.
'1d.
'128 U.S.C. § 2241(c) reads in pertinent part:
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless ...
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or Laws or Treaties
of the United States . ...
"This decision by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
rendered October 7, 1970, is unreported.
12The other two grounds for relief involved Miller's sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel. In ruling that Miller's representation by counsel was adequate, the
Fourth Circuit rejected the claimed incompetence of counsel. 457 F.2d at 701. The other
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these two claims was the contention that Miller's fifth amendment right
to remain silent was abridged by the trial judge's reliance on Miller's
silence in response to Grover Robbs' confession. The Fourth Circuit ruled
that the fifth amendment is a bar only to confessions compelled by the
government; since, according to the court, Miller was not under police
custodial interrogation at the time, this compulsion was absent.,3
The single meritorious ground for relief, according to the Fourth
Circuit, was the claim that, since Grover Robbs could not have been
compelled to testify,14 the introduction of his confession implicating
Miller violated Miller's sixth amendment right to confront an opposing
witness. The court ruled that the confession was not offered as proof of
the truth of its contents but only to show that the statement was made
and that Miller did not respond verbally to it. Because the veracity of the
confession was not in issue, the Fourth Circuit felt Miller could have
gained nothing by cross-examining Grover about the confession. 5 Thus
the court intimated that Miller's sixth amendment right of confrontation
was not abridged."5
ground for relief was the alleged denial of Miller's effective assistance of counsel, because
all three co-defendants were represented by a single attorney at a joint trial. The Fourth
Circuit disposed of this claim by finding the interests of the co-defendants were not signifi-
cantly in conflict. Id. at 701-02.
'11d. at 703.
"E.g.. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
15457 F.2d at 703. The distinction between the use of grover Robbs' confession as a
predicate for Miller's silence vis-A-vis proof of the veracity of the facts therein asserted
appears insufficient. The Virginia law on adoptive admissions, adhering to the majority
position, provides:
[W]hen a statement accusing one of the commission of an offenst is made
in his presence and hearing and is not denied, both the statement and the
fact of his failure to deny are admissible in a criminal proceeding against
him as evidence of his acquiesence in its truth . . . . [Tlhe statement is
not offered in evidence as proof of a fact asserted ....
Dykeman v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 807, 811-12, 113 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1960). By thus
accepting Grover's confession as a statement in which Miller acknowledged his belief and
then using this tacit assent as a basis for its decision, the court avoided determining the
validity of the confession.
"The Fourth Circuit did not state that the sixth amendment right was not abridged,
but it did state that cross-examination would have been unproductive. 457 F.2d at 703. The
court apparently felt that the sixth amendment claim was inapposite in this particular case.
The right of confrontation could have been rightly invoked if the truth of the confession
had been in issue, and the truth of the confession would have been in issue if the confession
had been offered to prove substantive evidence. E.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Instead, the court held that the confession
was merely a statement with which Miller agreed, and thus the veracity of the confession
was not in issue. Noting the narrow scope of the sixth amendment protection, Mr. Justice
Harlan commented that the confrontation clause is "not well designed for taking into
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In deciding this point, the Fourth Circuit noted that, under Virginia
law, Grover Robbs' confession was inadmissible as a context for Miller's
silence. Virginia law requires that the adoptive admission of guilt be a
logical interpretation of the defendant's failure to speak.7 Here, certain
circumstances, including the receipt of the Miranda warning'" and
Miller's previous denial of guilt, 9 preclude this logical inference of guilt
from silence. 0 Because it found other evidence overwhelmingly indicative
of Miller's guilt,2' the Fourth Circuit deemed this error under Virginia
law harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2
By finding "it was error [only] under the Virginia law of evidence to
receive Robbs' confession as explanatory of Miller's silence when ac-
cused,"'  the court refrained from ruling on the constitutionality of adop-
tive admissions in custody as used in criminal cases. It may be argued
that the Fourth Circuit should have disposed of the constitutional claims
more conclusively, since a court should determine prior to its admission
that evidence was not procured in derogation of the constitutional rights
of the accused. With respect to adoptive admissions, two constitutional
barriers seem to emerge: 2 the fifth amendment protection against com-
account the numerous factors that must be weighed in passing on the appropriateness of
rules of evidence." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
'"See Knight v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 433, 83 S.E.2d 738 (1954); Plymale v. Com-
monwealth, 195 Va. 582, 79 S.E.2d 610 (1954).
1457 F.2d at 701.
'Od.
'Id. at 702.
"The Fourth Circuit noted that Miller fled when he was not pursued, that the police
search of his person produced rolls of coins similar to those taken in the robbery, and that
the abducted victim persuasively identified Miller. 457 F.2d at 703.
21d. In applying the overwhelming evidence test, the Fourth Circuit followed the
Supreme Court in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). The majority in
Harrington endorsed the overwhelming evidence test as the proper analytical tool for deter-
mining whether a constitutional error falls within the scope of "harmless beyond a reasona-
ble doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Representing a minority of
three, Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Harrington enunciated another method
of analysis, the impact test, as the harmless error test. The impact test as premised in
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 26, requires "for an error to be 'harmless' it must have
made no contribution to a criminal conviction." 395 U.S. at 255 (emphasis by the Court).
This test apparently considers the "bombshell effect" of the error on the trier of facts.
Subsequent decisions such as Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) and Whiteley v.
Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 569 n.13 (1971) indicate the Supreme Court's apparent acceptance
of the overwhelming evidence test, although this acceptance is less than unanimous. E.g.,
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
1457 F.2d at 703.
2 In certain circumstances, the use of an adoptive admission has also been found
violative of the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront an opposing witness. E.g.,
Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 413 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 994 (1970).
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pelled self-incrimination 25 as extended by Miranda, and the fourteenth
amendment right to procedural due process.
2
1
The paradigm adoptive admission frequently produces a violation of
fifth amendment protection,2 7 but the fifth amendment affords the defen-
dant little in the way of a shield because courts, able to consider such a
violation "harmless, ' 28 often ignore this infringement.29 The due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment will provide the necessary protection
if courts treat adoptive admissions and involuntary confessions as equally
injurious to the defendant. However, courts are hesitant to recognize such
a violation of the due process clause, 3 since an involuntary confession
is considered an error of such import so as to merit automatic reversal .3
It is contended that, in the instant case, both the fifth and fourteenth
amendment rights of the defendant were breached. Thus, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals should have reversed Miller's conviction.
Adoptive Admissions and Miranda
The Supreme Court emphasized the liberal scope of the fifth amend-
ment protection in custodial interrogation in footnote 37 in Miranda v.
Arizona,'
2
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penal-
ize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution
may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or
claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
3
For discussion of the Fourth Circuit's treatment of this claim in Miller v. Cox, see note 16
supra.
"U.S. CONST. amend. V reads in pertinent part:
No person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ....
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I reads in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2E.g., United States v. Allsenberrie, 424 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Wick, 416 F.2d 61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 961 (1969).
2Note 22 supra.
"Note 27 supra.
a'E.g., In re Luallen, 321 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Tenn. 1970), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Luallen v. Neil, 453 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1971).
3'Note 101 infra.
32384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11d. at 468 n.37.
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Because the silence of the defendant is a requisite element of adoptive
admissions, there appears to be little doubt that the fifth amendment bars
the introduction into evidence of an adoptive admission obtained during
custodial interrogation.34 Accordingly, in Cockrell v. Oberhauser,3 a
conviction involving an adoptive admission procured during police ques-
tioning of a suspected confederate was reversed as violative of the consti-
tutional protection from compelled self-incrimination. In that case,
Cockrell and a co-defendant were in the same room in the police station
when the co-defendant identified Cockrell to the interrogating officer as
the person who sold her marijuana. Cockrell remained silent, even when
"[t]he officer asked . . .what he had to say about [the confession]
"36
The difference in the situations in Cockrell and in the instant case is
minimal, for in both cases the suspect's reaction to the confession of a
confederate comprised the challenged evidence. The interrogating officer
in Cockrell invited a reaction to the co-defendant's statement and noted
Cockrell's responsive silence. 7 In the instant case, Miller was not en-
couraged to reply to Grover's confession, but his silence in response
thereto was duly noted."8
Like Cockrell, appellant Miller claimed a violation of his constitu-
tional right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.39 Discussing
this contention, the Fourth Circuit intimated that custodial interrogation
of a suspect triggers an extension of this fifth amendment protection to
him."0 The court then denied Miller's claim by ruling that this prerequisite
was not met since Miller was not considered to have been in custodial
interrogation when Grover confessed. 1 The determination that Miller
was not under custodial interrogation at that time was arguably erro-
neous.
The court employed a questionable application of Miranda to explain
this determination. In apparent reliance upon a footnote in Miranda
which purported to define "custodial interrogation" as "an investigation
"'E.g., Luallen v. Neil, 453 F.2d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 1971). The fifth amendment right
"protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise
provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. . . ." Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). The silence of the defendant, as used in adoptive
admissions, is as "testimonial" or "communicative" as are the nods and headshakes noted
by the Court as being included in this fifth amendment protection. 384 U.S. at 761 n.5.
"413 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 994 (1970).
3413 F.2d at 257.
37d.
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which had focused on an accused," the Fourth Circuit noted that "the
attention of the police detective was focused on Grover Robbs and not
upon Miller." 3 However, the investigation had focused on the defendant
sufficiently for the police detective to note Miller's lack of verbal response
to Grover Robbs' confession.4 Further, this declaration by the Fourth
Circuit appears to limit unduly the application of "custodial interroga-
tion" as that term is defined and used in the text of Miranda. This textual
definition is an interrogation, by police officers, of a person "taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."
45
Miller appears to have been in custodial interrogation when Grover
confessed, despite the finding of the Fourth Circuit. Miller was in cus-
tody, 4 for he was apprehended by the police, taken to the police station,
placed in a room with other suspects in the same crime, and advised of
his constitutional rights.47 Because the warning of constitutional rights is
required before the police may interrogate a subject who is in custody,
8
the reading of the warning by the police indicates they believed Miller was
in custody. Miller also appears to have been interrogated by police offi-
cers while he was in custody, because he had denied participation in the
crime prior to Grover Robbs' confession. 9 Further, the facts, although
sketchy, imply that Miller's interrogation had not been completed: 0 he
was detained in the same room with another suspect being questioned
about the crime for which Miller had been apprehended,5 1 and the police
detective expected Miller to respond to the confession.
Without considering these points, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Miller
was not under police interrogation, because his silence was in response
to an accusation volunteered by Grover Robbs and not to questions pro-
pounded by police officers.53 It is contended that this distinction, which
42384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
11457 F.2d at 703.
"Id. at 701.
11384 U.S. at 444.
"Accord, Commonwealth v. Moody, 429 Pa. 39, 239 A.2d 409, cert. denied, 393 U.S.
882 (1968).
4457 F.2d at 701.
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
4457 F.2d at 701.
5 Even if Miller's interrogation had been completed, his right to remain silent did not
evaporate upon the conclusion of the questioning. The Supreme Court has ruled that, once
a defendant has manifested a desire to remain silent, the interrogation must cease until the
defendant subsequently initiates the conversation voluntarily. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 473-74 (1966).
51457 F.2d at 701.
521d.
"Id. at 703. Contra, Ivey v. United States, 344 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1965).
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ignores the practical aspects of police questioning, is not warranted by
Miranda. The Court in Miranda spoke of the constitutional perils inher-
ent in "interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,"'54
and it held the fifth amendment privilege jeopardized "when an individual
is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authori-
ties . . . and is subjected to questioning. . . -"I The elaboration upon
this theme indicates that the police officer requirement in custodial inter-
rogation was not intended to distinguish an accusation levelled by a police
officer from an accusation by a co-defendant, if the defendant was in
police custody when either accusation was made. It appears that the
police officer requirement was included to distinguish between question-
ing by police officers and questioning by civilians, when the suspect was
not in police custody."
Adoptive Admissions and Due Process
Even if the Fourth Circuit had found an infringement upon Miller's
fifth amendment right, his conviction may still have been sustained, be-
cause the other evidence may have been so overwhelming as to make this
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.57 However, the possibly abu-
sive exploitations of adoptive admissions-for example, as methods of
presenting an accusation without subjecting the accuser to cross-
examination58 or of introducing evidence highly prejudicial to the defen-
dant5 -indicate a need for providing greater protection of the criminal
defendant in such cases. If the use of an adoptive admission can be shown
to abridge the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process," this
needed protection may be provided.
Although appellant Miller did not do so, it is arguable that he could
have used the due process clause as an additional constitutional attack
on the validity of admitting his adoptive admission. Presently the fifth
and fourteenth amendments may be used almost interchangeably to de-
feat compelled self-incrimination;" but prior to the 1964 decision in
Malloy v. Hogan,62 the Supreme Court distinguished two types of pres-
11384 U.S. at 445.
Old. at 478.
Old. at 457-61.
57E.g., United States v. Guzman, 446 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1971). For discussion of the
overwhelming evidence rule, see notes 21-22 supra.
-"E.g., United States ex rel. Dukes v. Wallack, 414 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1969).
5 E.g., United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1970).
1°For relevant portion of the fourteenth amendment, see note 26 supra.
"E.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment); Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967) (fourteenth amendment).
62378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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sures to speak. The first, legal compulsion, is duress by the judicial pro-
cess, 3 such as the threat of a contempt citation for silence, and the fifth
amendment prohibits such compulsion. 4 The second form of compulsion
is a pressure, such as torture, which violates "the dignity and integrity of
human beings. ' '6 5 The Supreme Court has declared involuntary confes-
sions illustrative of this second form of compulsion,6 and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment protects against this type of compul-
sion to speak. 7
Four undesirable attributes of involuntary confessions contribute to
the determination of unconstitutionality under the due process clause, and
these four traits are found in adoptive admissions in custody as well. One
of these undesirable features is the likelihood that such confessions are
unreliable as evidence. This unreliability is predicated upon the thought
that involuntary confessions are often voiced merely to terminate torture
by appeasing the oppressor. Thus they are considered likely to be only
what the victim hoped the torturer wanted to hear, and less reliable than
a confession prompted by free will. 9
A second objectionable feature of an involuntary confession is the
"bombshell effect"7 it has on a jury, an impact which is both unquantifia-
ble7' and very persuasive.12 This effect, imputed to the status of the confes-
sion as a statement of the defendant,73 is so overwhelming that juries are
considered incapable of either limiting the implications of a confession
6The Supreme Court has cited as legal compulsion the "processes of justice by which
the accused may be called as a witness and required to testify." Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 285 (1935).
64E.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 458 (1972). In the 1964 case of Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Supreme Court held the fifth amendment applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment, expressly overruling the 1908 decision of
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) which had held the fifth amendment available
only in federal courts.
651 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.81 (1969). Accord, Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1935).
"Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1935).
"E.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219 (1941).
"E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,
236 (1941). Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confessions in the U.S. Supreme
Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35, 43 (1962); MCCORMICK § 147; 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra
note 65, at § 5.81.
"Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,625 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
7"People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 401 P.2d 665, 674, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 202 (1965).
7'E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958); cf Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965).
"E.g., People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 401 P.2d 665, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1965).
731d.
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to the single confessor among multiple defendants74 or disregarding the
confession if it is later deemed involuntary.75 This bombshell effect is
minimized when a judge tries the case without a jury, for judges are
deemed able to disregard inadmissible evidence in their deliberations.
7
1
A third undesirable feature of involuntary confessions is that they are
extracted from the defendant against his will. In order to be admissible
in court, a confession must be found to be "voluntary." 77 The case law
development of this voluntariness requirement has culminated in the stip-
ulation that a voluntary confession must be the product of both a rational
intellect78 and the "unfettered exercise of [the defendant's] own will,"
79
which will was not "overborne by official pressure, fatigue, [or] sympathy
falsely aroused . . ... " In applying this standard, the Supreme Court
has recognized that psychological coercion inflicts no demonstrable dam-
age on the defendant yet is as damnable as physical coercion.', Thus,
although the circumstances surrounding involuntary confessions differ
from case to case,82 the Supreme Court has condemned the coercive
extraction of confessions from suspects who would not have confessed
freely.1
This coercive extraction of involuntary confessions is related to police
misconduct, the fourth undesirable facet of involuntary confessions. Such
misconduct may be either physical coercion84 or mental coercion.85 The
former is condemned for twisting the body of the defendant 6 and the
latter for twisting the defendant's mind by overcoming his will.87 Under
the rubric of mental coercion, the Supreme Court has reversed convic-
tions which involved confessions obtained by the use of drugs," exhaus-
74E.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
75E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219 (1941).
"E.g., Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 413 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 994
(1970); United States v. Krol, 372 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1967). But see Young v. Maryland,
455 F.2d 679, 681 (4th Cir. 1972) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
"E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
18E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
79Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
8Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
"E.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). As the Supreme Court has said, "IT]he blood of the accused is not the only hallmark
of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
"2Notes 77-81 supra.
93d.
"4E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1935).
85E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
nE.g., White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
"E.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.227 (1939).
mE.g.. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). At his request, defendant Townsend, a
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tive questioning by relays of police teams,89 threats," holding the suspect
incommunicado for a period of days,91 or refusal to provide requested
counsel. 2 In summary, the Court has declared that the due process clause
prohibits the acquisition of a confession by any procedure that amounts
to "fundamental unfairness.""
The determination of this fundamental unfairness is a subjective de-
termination, based on a close scrutiny of the facts,94 that the circumstan-
ces made "a suspect the unwilling collaborator in establishing his guilt."9
Factors considered include personality traits of the individual defendant,96
the interrogation procedure,97 and the degree to which the subtle pressure
inherent in a police-dominated atmosphere98 affected the defendant. In
the interest of verbal economy, the Court has adopted the phrase "totality
of circumstances" as a shorthand reference to a complex of improper
circumstances which, in aggregate, violate the defendant's due process
right although no single circumstance is violative of that right alone.' If
a defendant has confessed in such a totality of circumstances which was
subject to police control, a subsequent conviction will be reversed on the
ground of undesirable police action.'0' This reversal transmutes the police
heroin addict, received an injection of phenobarbital to combat withdrawal pains. However,
the phenobarbital had been secretly laced with hyoscine, a "truth serum."
81E.g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967).
"°E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
"E.g., Reek v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
1
2E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
"Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
"E.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
"Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 575 (1961).
"In considering personality traits, the Supreme Court has noted the defendant's physi-
cal condition, Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); mentality, Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199 (1960); age, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); education, Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); prior criminal experience, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962); nationality, Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); and the extent to which
the police provided for the suspect's basic needs, Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
"Interrogation procedures considered include number of questioners, Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); elapsed time of interrogation, Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199 (1960); hour of interrogation, Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); relay
questioning, Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); deception, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S.
528 (1963); moral pressure, United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951); threat of mob
action, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); and the use of drugs, Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963).
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
"E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
"'E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957).
'*'E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). In the past, this reversal was pro
forma upon the appearance of the involuntary confession in the record without regard to
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misconduct into a liability, thereby encouraging its termination. 102
The four features of an involuntary confession which render its use
unconstitutional appear in adoptive admissions as well. Thus it is argua-
ble that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment should also
prohibit the use of adoptive admissions in custody.
Adoptive admissions are unreliable due to the inconclusiveness of the
underlying premise. The adoptive admissions rule is premised on the
maxim "Qui tacet consentire videtur" (He who is silent consents).'
Under certain circumstances this adage may be valid, but conflicting
maxims may be equally valid in other circumstances." 4 Further, there are
instances in which persons did not react vocally to certain accusations. 5
The Supreme Court has identified the fallacy inherent in this type of
premise for a rule of evidence:
It is not universally true that a man who is conscious that he has
done a wrong will pursue a certain course not in harmony with the
conduct of a man who is conscious of having done an act which is
innocent, right, and proper.'
the quality or quantity of admissible evidence extrinsic of the confession. This reversal was
automatic because the introduction of an involuntary confession was considered so injurious
to the defendant as to be deemed harmful per se. E.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528
(1963). Two other errors widely accepted as elements in this class of errors causing auto-
matic reversals are a decision by a prejudiced judge, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927), and the denial of counsel for the defendant. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 371 U.S.
335 (1962). In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Supreme Court ruled that
the "setting" surrounding a constitutional error must be considered when determining the
harm attributable to the error prior to deciding whether to reverse. By requiring considera-
tion of the setting surrounding the error, the Court possibly intimated the abolition of a
class of errors, including involuntary confessions, that requires reversal upon mere appear-
ance in the record. However, many commentators have concluded that Chapman did not
dissolve this class of errors. W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFES-
SIONS § 52.01 (1972); G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 857, unnumbered note (8th ed. 1970); MCCORMICK § 148, n.35; Mause,
Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L.
REV. 519, 539 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HARMLESS ERROR]; The Supreme Court, 1966
Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 209 (1967). Subsequent cases appear to support this conclusion.
E.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967).
102E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
'0IV WIGMORE § 1071.
"'Silence in the face of accusation is "always lawful and often wise." Allen v. United
States, 273 F.2d 85, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
"One example is the trial of Jesus:
And when He was accused of the chief priests and elders, He answered
nothing. Then said Pilate unto Him, Hearest thou not how many things
they witness against thee? And He answered him to never a word; inso-
much that the governor marvelled greatly.
Matthew 27:12-14.
'"Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896).
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Thus, due to the fallacy of the underlying phrase,"7 the adoptive admis-
sions rule is inconclusive at best.
Recognizing certain of the flaws in the blanket acceptance implied in
"He who is silent consents," the courts have established certain limita-
tions which provide greater reliability. For example, the accused must
hear and understand the statement, 08 and he must not be physically or
emotionally restrained from responding." 9 Further, the expectation of a
response must be reasonable under the circumstances."0 As the Fourth
Circuit noted, the receipt of the Miranda warning and a previous denial
of participation in the crime deaden any "natural inclination to speak out
in . . .defense""' and thus make an expectation of response unreasona-
ble under those circumstances." 2 However, the determination by the trial
judge, in possession of the same facts as the Fourth Circuit, that Miller
could reasonably have been expected to respond"3 demonstrates the in-
sufficiency of these safeguards to insure the reliability of adoptive admis-
sions.
In addition to unreliability, the bombshell effect in also present in
adoptive admissions, because an adoptive admission is regarded as a
statement with which the defendant agrees." 4 Although an inference of
guilt may be consistent with silence in certain circumstances, the possibil-
ity of other personal reasons for the silence"' renders that inference a
mere possibility vis-d-vis a conclusive probability."' By stamping the
defendant's imprimatur on the statement, the adoptive admissions rule
transforms equivocal silence, often the product of a matrix of emotions,",
into a deceptively clear confession. Although relevant empirical evidence
" Text accompanying notes 104-06 supra. See Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582,
227 A.2d 904 (1967).
"'E.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); Sandez v. United States, 239 F.2d
239 (9th Cir. 1956) (non-English speaking defendant, accusation in English); Owens v.
United States, 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E.2d 895 (1947).
"'E.g., Gowen v. Bush, 76 F. 349 (8th Cir. 1896) (accident victim semiconscious);
People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 90 N.E.2d 48 (1949) (defendant intoxicated); Owens v.
United States, 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E.2d 895 (1947).
"'E.g., State v. Guffey, 261 N.C. 322, 134 S.E.2d 619 (1964).
"1 457 F.2d at 701.
112id.
"'Id. at 702.
'"E.g., Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1958).
"'E.g., Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893) ("Excessive timidity, nervous-
ness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character");
Miller v. United States, 320 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
"'E.g., Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 227 A.2d 904 (1967).
"'E.g., Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1892).
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is unavailable, jurors may be thus deceived as to the extent of the defen-
dant's agreement with the statement.1
8
The third undesirable feature of involuntary confessions, the extrac-
tion of an involuntary statement by a violation of the defendant's will, is
inherent in adoptive admissions. The warning that "anything [you] say
may be used against [you] in a court of law""' tends to promote silence,
thereby encouraging the defendant to stifle any impulse to speak.' The
idea that a confession will terminate coercion is comparable to the idea
that silence in the face of accusation will be a safe course of action. The
former is inherent in police interrogations that produce involuntary con-
fessions,' while the latter is a reasonable deduction from the police
warning that "anything [you] say may be used against [you] in a court
of law."' 22 Thus it appears that the pressure to remain silent, although
subtle, is sufficient to inhibit a natural impulse and thus overbear the
suspect's will.
In order to permit a suspect to assess more effectively his available
alternatives of silence or speech, the Sixth Circuit stated:
[T]he customary formula of warning should be changed, and the
respondent should be told, "If you say anything, it will be used
against you; if you do not say anything, that will be used against
you ." z
However, even this warning does not render the adoptive admission vol-
untary, for these alternatives merely focus the "option" available to the
accused: remain silent and permit the court to infer assent to the state-
ment, 2 or speak against a desire to remain silent.' The mere election
of the lesser of two evils does not exclude duress,12 and thus that "option"
presents no "free choice"'12 as required by the Supreme Court.'
2
1
"'This uncertainty is not recognized when a judge tries the case without a jury, for
judges are deemed able to employ the evidence properly in their deliberations. United States
v. Krol, 374 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1967).
"'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
'2E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 580 (1961); FEDERAL RULEs, Advisory
Committee's Note to rule 801(d)(2)(B), the text of which appears in note 4 supra.
121Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 580 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433
(1961).
'2E.g., United States ex reL Staino v. Brierly, 387 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1966).
'McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298, 299 (6th Cir. 1928).
'Note 4 supra.
12'Text accompanying notes 129-33 infra.
'E.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
'"Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967).
'2E.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (option to testify without immunity
1973]
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In order for the accused to make a free choice between speech and
silence, it appears that he must be warned that, if he remains silent in the
face of incriminating statements, his silence can be introduced as an
indication of his guilt. The suspect should be further informed that these
statements alone cannot be used against him only if he unequivocally
denies them." 9 Thus the suspect would be certain of the possible conse-
quences of both speech and silence in the face of accusation as well as
the safest method of denying these statements. The desire for a similar
certainty in the mind of the defendant prompted the Supreme Court to
write that
no system of criminal jusice can, or should, survive, if it comes
to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights.'
Since the only option presently offered the defendant must be inferred
from the notice of his right to remain silent (and, impliedly, a concomi-
tant right to speak), the suspect is apparently unable to make a rational
decision whether to speak or not.
Further, the environment surrounding an adoptive admission ob-
tained after the suspect had received the Miranda warning' indicates
that the adopting admitter intended to admit nothing. This conclusion is
based on the provision, by the Miranda warning,3 2 of a milieu in which
the accused may confess with full knowledge of, and protected by, his
constitutional rights. If a defendant wishes to confess, he may waive his
right to remain silent 3 and make the precise statement he intends. Yet
adoptive admissions are obtained only when the suspect remains silent.
Thus an adoptive admission should be considered involuntary because the
defendant did not choose to avail himself of an opportunity to confess.
Police misconduct, the fourth objectionable attribute of involuntary
confessions, may be present in an adoptive admission. A confession is a
statement, by the defendant, acknowledging facts necessary for convic-
tion for a crime.' 34 This acknowledgement is made by speech and, in
involuntary confessions, this speech is extracted from the defendant
against his will. An adoptive admission is an acquiescence in the state-
from prosecution or lose job); Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918)
(option to pay registration fee or be unable to market bonds).
'2'E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Rundle, 423 Pa. 93, 223 A.2d 88 (1966).
'3Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
'Note 2 supra.
1'3 Note 2 supra.
'3Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
'34E.g., Gladden v. Unsworth, 396 F.2d 373, 375 n.2 (9th Cir. 1968). WIGMORE § 1050;
McCORMICK § 144.
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ment of another, which acquiescence is manifested by silence.' As noted
above, by reading the Miranda warning' to the defendant, the police
elicit this inculpatory silence. Because the police control the circumstan-
ces producing the pressure to remain silent and due to their knowledge
of the adoptive admission rule, any subsequent conviction obtained by the
abusive use of the resulting silence arguably should be reversed due to
police misconduct.
Commonwealth v. Dravecz37 illustrates a reversal possibly predi-
cated on such police misconduct.3 ' Defendant Dravecz remained silent
while a police officer read him the statement of a third person connecting
Dravecz with the theft for which he was indicted.'39 This silence, subse-
quently introduced in court as an adoptive admission,' was censured by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which ruled the defendant was pro-
tected by the fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination
as applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause.' This determination appears consistent with the Supreme Court's
position on the accused's silence during custodial interrogation.'
The police misconduct in Dravecz differs from that in Miller v. Cox.
In the instant case, the detective noted, perhaps casually, that Miller
made no vocal response to Grover Robbs' confession.' However, the
policy of discouraging police misconduct should militate against different
treatment of the two defendants.' The police impropriety in Dravecz
jeopardized the conviction by precipitating a reversal. 4 ' Reversal in such
situations hastens the termination of this sort of interrogation proce-
dure.' The incomplete facts in the instant case reveal, at the least, re-
proachable police conduct. Although Miller was informed of his constitu-
tional right to remain silent, he was penalized for exercising that very
'FEDERAL RULES, Advisory Committee's Note to rule 801(d)(2)(B), the text of which
appears in note 4 supra.
13'Note 2 supra.
In424 Pa. 582, 227 A.2d 904 (1967).
InThe Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not specify police misconduct, but it did state
"[s]pringing a statement on him in this fashion suggests artifice." 227 A.2d at 908.
111d. at 905.
"0d.
"Id. It may be contended that the court could have also found the police impropriety
of actively eliciting the inculpatory silence so similar to police coercion of involuntary
confessions that the introduction of Dravecz's adoptive admission was prohibited by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
"'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). Accord, Cockrell v. Oberhauser,
413 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 994 (1970).
"'457 F.2d at 701.
"'HARMLESS ERROR at 551-52.
"'227 A.2d at 909.
'Text accompanying note 102 supra.
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right. "'47 If the Fourth Circuit had reversed Miller's conviction, it would
have rendered such action by the police a handicap to the state's prosecu-
tion, thereby providing a strong inducement for the abandonment of this
practice.
Thus it may be argued that the four undesirable features of involun-
tary confessions are present in adoptive admissions, and therefore adop-
tive admissions should be subjected to the same constitutional scrutiny
as involuntary confessions."' Adoptive admissions and involuntary con-
fessions do not correspond perfectly, for the adoptive admission evokes
the same visceral objection as coerced confessions only when the police
misconduct is egregious, as in Dravecz and Cockrell. However, the defen-
dant's reception of his Miranda warning"' triggers the fifth amendment
protection 5 ' and calls into question the reliability and voluntariness of
any adoptive admission obtained subsequently. 5' There may be instances
in which the introduction of such an adoptive admission may properly be
deemed harmless error. However, it is contended that the court, unlike
the Fourth Circuit in Miller v. Cox, should consider carefully whether the




It is urged that the courts apply the same standards of constitution-
ality to involuntary confessions and to adoptive admissions in criminal
cases. The Fourth Circuit declined to do so, ruling that the use of such
an adoptive admission in Miller v. Cox was not error of a constitutional
magnitude.'53 Because the introduction of this adoptive admission argua-
bly violated the defendant's fifth and fourteenth amendment rights, this
determination appears erroneous. The error would have been com-
17457 F.2d at 701.
"'Some courts have compared adoptive admissions with prosecutorial comment on the
defendant's declination to testify. E.g., Baker v. United States, 357 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1966).
The Supreme Court has consistently censured such prosecutorial comment. E.g., Stewart
v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961). But it has also intimated that under some circumstances
such comment would not require a reversal. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
However, there is an important distinction between adoptive admissions and prosecutorial
comment. The former channels the thoughts of the trier of facts to a predetermined end,
while the latter merely invites such triers to generate their own conjectures as to why the
defendant elected not to testify. This distinction appears sufficient to invalidate the analogy.
"'Note 2 supra.
"'Text accompanying notes 33-56 supra.
" Text accompanying notes 110-12 supra.
'52Notes 22 and 101 supra.
"1457 F.2d at 703.
